000			01464nab a22002297c 4500
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003			ES-MaIEF
005			20250228135838.0
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008			250228t2024 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_964113 _aAgranov, Marina
245	1	0	_aBargaining in the shadow of uncertainty _c by Marina Agranov, Hülya Eraslan, and Chloe Tergiman
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aIn bargaining environments with stochastic future surplus, failing to delay agreement can be inefficient when the expected future surplus is sufficiently high. Theoretically, such inefficiencies never arise under unanimity rule but can arise under majority rule. Using a laboratory experiment, we find support for these predictions, both when the unanimity rule is predicted to be more efficient and when there should be no difference between the two rules. We also find large point prediction deviations under the majority rule. We show these deviations can be explained by higher-than-predicted egalitarian sharing and a lower risk of being excluded from future agreements.
650		4	_948552 _aTEORIA ECONOMICA
650		4	_947824 _aNEGOCIACION COLECTIVA
650		4	_948576 _aTOMA DE DECISIONES
700	1		_972367 _aEraslan, Hülya
700	1		_972368 _aTergiman, Chloe
773	0		_9172776 _oOP 2136/2024/4 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics _w(IEF)64890 _x 1945-7669 _g v. 16, n. 4, November 2024, p. 229-258.
942			_cART