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999			_c150369 _d150369
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20250228134858.0
007			ta
008			250228t2024 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_972365 _aLipsitz, Michael
245	1	0	_aNoncompete agreements and the welfare of consumers _c by Michael Lipsitz and Mark J. Tremblay
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aEmployee spin-offs harm incumbent firms by increasing competition (benefiting consumers) and preventing firm owners from making beneficial investments in workers who may later spin off (harming consumers). We model noncompete agreements (NCAs) as solutions for the firm and analyze the resulting trade-off for consumers. We show that market structure and the nature of investment play large roles. Counterintuitively, increased investment benefits have the potential to harm consumers such that industries where firms value NCAs the most are those where harm is greater. Finally, we draw two analogies between NCAs and antitrust and show how those areas inform NCA policy.
650		4	_96729 _aACUERDOS COMERCIALES
650		4	_947786 _aMONOPOLIOS
650		4	_947868 _aOLIGOPOLIOS
650		4	_954507 _aEMPRENDEDORES
650		4	_940657 _aCONSUMIDORES
700	1		_972366 _aTremblay, Mark J.
773	0		_9172776 _oOP 2136/2024/4 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics _w(IEF)64890 _x 1945-7669 _g v. 16, n. 4, November 2024, p. 112-153.
942			_cART