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008			250228t2024 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_972363 _aBarrios, John M.
245	1	2	_aA new era of midnight mergers _bantitrust risk and investor disclosures _c by John M. Barrios and Thomas G. Wollmann
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aAntitrust authorities search public documents to discover anti-competitive mergers. Thus, investor disclosures may alert them to deals that would otherwise go undetected, creating disincentives for managers to divulge certain transactions. We study this behavior in publicly traded US companies. First, we employ a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of mandatory disclosures. We find that releasing information to investors poses antitrust risk. Second, we introduce a method for measuring undisclosed mergers that relies on financial accounting reporting requirements. We find that undisclosed mergers total $1.85 trillion between 2002 and 2016.
650		4	_950222 _aCOMPETENCIA
650		4	_947786 _aMONOPOLIOS
650		4	_944260 _aFINANCIACION
650		4	_948302 _aRIESGO
650		4	_947531 _aINVERSIONES
700	1		_972364 _aWollmann, Thomas G.
773	0		_9172776 _oOP 2136/2024/4 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics _w(IEF)64890 _x 1945-7669 _g v. 16, n. 4, November 2024, p. 77-111.
942			_cART