000			01459nab a2200229 c 4500
999			_c150366 _d150366
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20250228085713.0
007			ta
008			250228t2024 xxk||||| |||| 00| 0eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_972360 _aCussen, Diego
245	1	0	_aUsing list prices to collude or to compete? _c Diego Cussen and Juan-Pablo Montero
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aCollusion is deemed unlikely in wholesale markets where upstream suppliers and intermediate buyers privately negotiate discounts off list prices and sales quotas are unfeasible. However, many wholesale markets include both small and large buyers who compete in the retail market. We study the role of publicly announced list prices in this wholesale-retail setting, whether suppliers collude or compete. When suppliers collude, public announcements of list prices extend the possibility of collusion from small to large buyers (the multi-buyer contact effect). When suppliers compete, these announcements provide them with commitment to negotiate better terms with large buyers (the commitment effect).
650		4	_96729 _aACUERDOS COMERCIALES
650		4	_947868 _aOLIGOPOLIOS
650		4	_947786 _aMONOPOLIOS
650		4	_940216 _aCOMPETENCIA DESLEAL
700	1		_972361 _aMontero, Juan-Pablo
773	0		_9172801 _oOP 282/2024/664 _tThe Economic Journal _w(IEF)330 _x 0013-0133 [papel] _g v. 134, n. 664, November 2024, p. 3232-3261.
942			_cART