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008			250227t2024 xxk||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_939249 _aSalant, Stephen Walter
245	1	0	_aSpending and pricing to deter arbitrage _c Stephen W. Salant
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aThis article presents examples of arbitrage deterrence from the pharmaceutical, chemical and auto industries. Based on these cases, it develops two models where a monopolist prices and spends to deter arbitrage. The models differ in whether the lower price is set by the firm or negotiated with a representative of consumers. In both models, imports into the high-price market are completely deterred, but the two markets are nonetheless linked by the threat of arbitrage. If this linkage is ignored and the absence of arbitrage is misattributed to exogenous factors, econometric estimates of firm bargaining power will be biased upwards.
650		4	_929858 _aARBITRAJE INDUSTRIAL
650		4	_946682 _aINDUSTRIA FARMACEUTICA
650		4	_946744 _aINDUSTRIA QUIMICA
650		4	_947458 _aINDUSTRIA AUTOMOVILISTICA
650		4	_947786 _aMONOPOLIOS
773	0		_9172583 _oOP 282/2024/662 _tThe Economic Journal _w(IEF)330 _x 0013-0133 [papel] _g v. 134, n. 662, August 2024, p. 2638-2654.
942			_cART