| 000 | 02700nab a2200253 c 4500 | ||
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| 999 |
_c150354 _d150354 |
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| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20250227151731.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 250227t2024 ne |||||o|||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
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| 100 | 1 |
_967775 _aLammers, Jeroen |
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| 245 | 1 | 4 |
_aThe case for an EU cap on interest on underpaid tax _helectrónico _bprotecting the internal market _c Jeroen Lammers |
| 520 | _aThis article examines whether the differences in the calculation of interest on underpaid taxes among EU Member States could conflict with or impact the functioning of the EU internal market. The analysis indicates that such a conflict exists, and that an EU minimum standard protecting taxpayers’ rights is justified to remedy this while harmonizing the rules on interest accrual entirely would likely exceed the limits of the proportionality principle. The article’s starting point is the recent Danish Supreme Court ruling on beneficial ownership which recommends that the Danish legislator review national rules on interest accrual in cases of prolonged tax proceedings and consider a remedy that allows disputed amounts to be deposited with tax authorities. It evaluates the international and EU legal frameworks addressing this issue and compares interest accrual rules between Member States. The article finds that these legal frameworks offer insufficient guidance. It also discusses the Danish Supreme Court’s suggested remedy and asserts that it is ineffective and inefficient. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that it is not suitable as an EU minimum standard, and the latter should instead be designed as a maximum percentage of the disputed amount. This relatively simple approach is a suitable manner for realizing the intended objective as it would incentivize taxpayers to pay their tax bills on time while safeguarding their fundamental human rights wherever they are established in the EU. Moreover, it would prevent placing undue administrative burdens on either taxpayers or tax administrations and would not impede Member States’ abilities to design their tax administrative procedures to fit their national tax systems and practices. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_947813 _aINFRACCIONES Y SANCIONES TRIBUTARIAS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_948144 _aPROCEDIMIENTO TRIBUTARIO |
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| 650 | 4 |
_942654 _aDEVENGO |
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| 650 | 4 |
_941169 _aCONTRIBUYENTES |
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| 650 | 4 |
_942389 _aDERECHOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_948644 _aUNION EUROPEA |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947462 _aINCENTIVOS FISCALES |
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| 773 | 0 |
_9173108 _oOP 2141/2024/1 _tIntertax _w(IEF)55619 _x 0165-2826 _g v. 52, n.1, enero 2024, p. 8-23 |
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| 856 | _yhttps://kluwerlawonline.com/api/Product/CitationPDFURL?file=Journals\TAXI\TAXI2024002.pdf | ||
| 942 | _cART | ||