000			01421nab a2200229 c 4500
999			_c150217 _d150217
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20250206102709.0
007			ta
008			250206t2024 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_972271 _aPiguillem, Facundo
245	1	0	_aSticky spending, sequestration, and government debt _c Facundo Piguillem and Alessandro Riboni
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aOnce established, government spending programs tend to continue. A commonly held view is that spending inertia leads to unsustainable debt, ultimately requiring fiscal adjustments such as "sequestration." We show that by insuring against political turnover, inertia may reduce politicians' incentives to accumulate debt. However, large preexisting commitments and the prospect of future stabilization can lead to overspending to dilute past administrations' commitments. Finally, we show that political polarization amplifies incentives to prioritize inertial programs, potentially explaining the increased share of mandatory spending in the US budget.
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_944787 _aGASTO PUBLICO
650		4	_942647 _aDEUDA PUBLICA
650		4	_942888 _aESTADOS UNIDOS
700	1		_972272 _aRiboni, Alessandro
773	0		_9172778 _oOP 234/2024/11 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _g v. 114, n.11, November 2024, p. 3513-3550.
942			_cART