000			01435nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c150205 _d150205
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20250205093711.0
007			ta
008			250203t2024 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_972254 _aSchreger, Jesse
245	1	0	_aCentral Bank credibility and fiscal responsibility _c Jesse Schreger, Pierre Yared and Emilio Zaratiegui
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe consider a New Keynesian model with strategic monetary and fiscal interactions. The fiscal authority maximizes social welfare. Monetary policy is delegated to a central bank with an anti-inflation bias that suffers from a lack of commitment. The impact of central bank hawkishness on debt issuance is nonmonotonic because increased hawkishness reduces the benefit from fiscal stimulus while simultaneously increasing real debt capacity. Starting from high levels of hawkishness (dovishness), a marginal increase in the central bank's anti-inflation bias decreases (increases) debt issuance.
650		4	_932291 _aBANCOS CENTRALES
650		4	_948062 _aPOLITICA MONETARIA
650		4	_942647 _aDEUDA PUBLICA
650		4	_943015 _aECONOMIA KEYNESIANA
650		4	_946815 _aINFLACION
700			_955327 _aYared, Pierre
700	1		_972255 _aZaratiegui, Emilio
773	0		_9172578 _oOP 2145/2024/3 _tThe American Economic Review _x 2640-205X _g v. 6, n. 3, September 2024, p. 377-394.
942			_cART