000			01646nab a2200229 c 4500
999			_c150131 _d150131
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20250116153955.0
007			ta
008			250115t2024 uk |||||o|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_924061 _aKonrad, Kai Andreas
245	1	4	_aThe political economy of paternalism _c Kai A. Konrad
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aSome citizens place a high value on making decisions for themselves. Other citizens are happy to delegate decisions to a government agency. Such differences in political attitudes to paternalism can be explained in a strict rational-choice model with citizens’ heterogeneous tastes in the economic sphere. Citizens with more eccentric tastes and with high decision-making abilities tend to favor a libertarian regime. If majority preferences matter, heterogeneity in economic preferences and analytical abilities can also explain whether the political regime is more paternalist or more libertarian. As decision-making skills are a learnable capability, the strategic complementarity of individuals’ investments in analytical skills in the context of political regime outcomes suggests a feedback mechanism that can cause multiple expectations equilibria. Both a libertarian regime or a paternalist regime can emerge.
650		4	_948576 _aTOMA DE DECISIONES
650		4	_925834 _aANALISIS ECONOMICO
650		4	_aECONOMIA _943074
650		4	_aREGIMENES POLITICOS _948227
650		4	_aSOCIOLOGIA POLITICA _948477
773	0		_9172788 _oOP 1443/2024/201/1/2 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g vol. 201, n.1-2 (octubre 2024) p. 61-81
942			_cART