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040			_aES-MaIEF _beng _cES-MaIEF
245			_aEmpirical and Computational Approaches to Collective Choice _c editors, Simon Medcalfe, Shane Sanders
520			_aThis special issue examines empirical and computational approaches to collective choice, the aggregation of individual preferences to form a public or social choice via some aggregation rule. Some of the aggregation rules considered herein include Borda rule, rank sum aggregation, and majority rule. Arrow (1951) demonstrated that axiomatic rationality at the individual level cannot assure freedom from aggregation paradoxes in collective choice, and this special issue considers several novel data sets and computational and experimental methods to assess the robustness of contemporary aggregation rules and settings. The collected papers provide much-needed evidence in a field that has traditionally presented empirical challenges.
700	1		_972094 _aMedcalfe, Simon
700	1		_966998 _aSanders, Shane
773	0		_9172103 _oOP 1443/2024/199/1/2 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v.199, n.1-2, april 2024, special issue
942			_cART