000			01729nab a2200229 c 4500
999			_c149957 _d149957
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20241108131210.0
007			ta
008			241107t2024 us ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _beng _cES-MaIEF
100			_972088 _aRossel, Lucia
245	1	4	_aThe political business cycle of tax reforms _c Lucia Rossel Flores, Martijn Huysmans, Joras Ferwerda
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aA political business cycle (PBC), with governments adjusting and timing economic policy for electoral gains, has long been hypothesized. A lack of data has so far limited testing of this phenomenon for government policies as opposed to fiscal outcomes such as tax revenue or government deficit, especially at the national level. We use new monthly data on tax reform announcements for a set of 22 democracies, 1988–2014, to test the PBC hypothesis for taxation. In addition to the traditional electoral strategy formulation of the PBC, we also put forward and test a capacity version of the PBC. We find evidence for the capacity version but not the traditional version of the PBC: tax reforms are less likely to be announced before elections and more likely after elections, independently of whether they are increases or decreases. Our evidence suggests that while a PBC exists, it may be less driven by strategic electioneering and more innocuous than previously assumed
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_948066 _aPOLITICA ECONOMICA
650		4	_943408 _aELECCIONES
700			_972089 _aHuysmans, Martijn
700			_958425 _aFerwerda, Joras
773	0		_9172507 _oOP 1443/2024/200/1/2 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 200, n.1-2, july 2024, p.65-88
942			_cART