000			01459nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c149790 _d149790
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20240919145441.0
007			ta
008			240912c2024 us |||p| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _beng _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100			_971952 _aKaya, Ayça
245	1	0	_aRepeated trading _btransparency and market structure _c by Ayça Kaya and Santanu Roy
260			_c2024
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aWe analyze the effect of transparency of past trading volumes in markets where an informed long-lived seller can repeatedly trade with short-lived uninformed buyers. Transparency allows buyers to observe previously sold quantities. In markets with intraperiod monopsony (single buyer each period), transparency reduces welfare if the ex ante expected quality is low but improves welfare if the expected quality is high. The effect is reversed in markets with intraperiod competition (multiple buyers each period). This discrepancy in the efficiency implications of transparency is explained by how buyer competition affects the seller's ability to capture rents, which, in turn, influences market screening.
650		4	_940148 _aCOMPRAVENTA
650		4	_950214 _aACTIVOS FINANCIEROS
650		4	_947736 _aMERCADOS FINANCIEROS
700			_971953 _aSantanu, Roy
773	0		_9172322 _oOP 234/2024/8 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _g v. 114, n.8, August 2024, p. 2388-2435
942			_cART