000			01544nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c149659 _d149659
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20240625150255.0
007			ta
008			240625s2024 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_971828 _aCalford, Evan M.
245		0	_aContingent reasoning and dynamic public goods provision _c Evan M. Calford and Timothy N. Cason
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aContributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events, others who are better at extracting information from past rather than future or concurrent events, and Nash players who effectively perform contingent thinking. Contrary to equilibrium, the dynamic provision mechanism does not lead to lower contributions than the static mechanism.
650		4	_943074 _aECONOMIA
650		4	_932203 _aASPECTOS PSICOLOGICOS
650		4	_933416 _aBIENES PUBLICOS
650		4	_943407 _aELECCION SOCIAL
700			_971829 _aCason, Timothy N.
773	0		_9172046 _oOP 2136/2024/2 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics _w(IEF)64890 _x1945-7669 _g v. 16, n. 2, May 2024, p. 236-266
942			_cART