000			01417nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c149589 _d149589
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20240605183105.0
007			ta
008			240605t2023 ne |||||o|||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_954876 _aDagan, Tsilly
245		0	_aGLoBE _helectrónico _bthe potential costs of cooperation _c Tsilly Dagan
500			_aResumen.
520			_aThis article argues that the fact that the 2021 global tax deal (focusing on Pillar 2) is cooperative is not in itself proof of the deal being beneficial (and certainly not equally beneficial) for all parties. Developing countries particularly may benefit less and possibly even lose from the agreement. The article focuses on two features of cooperation that may tilt the playing field in favour of developed countries: agenda influence and structural incentives to cooperate. Since the OECD had control over both the agenda and the ways in which the game was structured, it is not surprising that the deal served the interests of its members.
650		4	_967772 _aSEGUNDO PILAR (OCDE)
650		4	_aIMPUESTO DE SOCIEDADES _945680
650		4	_967681 _aTIPO MÍNIMO GLOBAL
650		4	_aEVALUACION _944020
650			_aFISCALIDAD INTERNACIONAL _944303
650		4	_aPAISES EN DESARROLLO _947936
773	0		_9171820 _oOP 2141/2023/10 _tIntertax _w(IEF)55619 _x 0165-2826 _g v. 51, issue 10, October 2023, 12 p.
942			_cRE