000 01528nab a2200253 c 4500
999 _c149568
_d149568
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20240603185125.0
007 ta
008 240603t2024 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|us d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
100 _971786
_aKina, Özlem
245 0 _aRedistributive capital taxation revisited
_c by Özlem Kina, Ctirad Slavík and Hakki Yazici
500 _aResumen.
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aThis paper uses a rich quantitative model with endogenous skill acquisition to show that capital-skill complementarity provides a quantitatively significant rationale to tax capital for redistributive governments. The optimal capital income tax rate is 67 percent, while it is 61 percent in an identically calibrated model without capital-skill complementarity. The skill premium falls from 1.9 to 1.84 along the transition following the optimal reform in the capital-skill complementarity model, implying substantial indirect redistribution from skilled to unskilled workers. These results show that a redistributive government should take into account capital-skill complementarity when taxing capital.
650 4 _aCAPITAL
_933516
650 4 _aIMPUESTOS
_947460
650 4 _948219
_aREDISTRIBUCION
650 4 _947776
_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700 1 _971787
_aSlavík, Ctirad
700 _965567
_aYazici, Hakki
773 0 _9171817
_oOP 2137/2024/2
_tAmerican Economic Journal : Macroeconomics
_w(IEF)64915
_x 1945-7707
_g v. 16, n. 2, April 2024, p. 182-216
942 _cART