000			01947nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c149563 _d149563
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20240531134403.0
007			ta
008			240531t2024 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_971779 _aNakatani, Ryota
245		0	_aRevenue decentralization and the probability of a fiscal crisis _bis there a tipping point for adverse effects? _c Ryota Nakatani
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aDoes government revenue decentralization affect the probability of a fiscal crisis? Is there a tipping point where revenue decentralization worsens the probability of a fiscal crisis? To answer these questions, we use cross-country panel data on 66 countries from 1982 to 2019. The binary choice models show that revenue decentralization is positively associated with crisis probability when countries exceed a certain threshold of decentralization. When more than approximately 16 percent of general government revenue is decentralized to local governments, this adverse effect of revenue decentralization occurs. This is consistent with the recent theoretical prediction that tax revenue collection efforts weaken as the government decentralizes revenue more. The adverse effects of revenue decentralization are large in low-income countries. Our finding implies the benefits of revenue centralization, such as economies of scale for revenue agencies, eliminating externalities due to tax competition, and the intergovernmental insurance role of federal transfers against local shocks.
650			_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067
650		4	_aFEDERALISMO FISCAL _944156
650		4	_aINGRESOS PUBLICOS _944455
650		4	_aDESCENTRALIZACION _942577
650		4	_aHACIENDAS LOCALES _945217
650		4	_aANALISIS DE PANELES _925831
773	0		_9171844 _oOP 581/2024/3 _tPublic Finance Review _w(IEF)21382 _x 0048-5853 _g v.52, n. 3, May 2024, p. 376-396
942			_cART