000			01690nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c149356 _d149356
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20240510094639.0
007			ta
008			240510t2024 gm ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
245		0	_aOn the governance of carbon dioxide removal _ba public economics perspective _c Ottmar Edenhofer, Max Franks, Matthias Kalkuhl and Artur Runge-Metzger
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aClimate policy increasingly requires carbon dioxide removal (CDR). We describe its role, characterize optimal flows for non-permanent removals and describe optimal pricing regimes under different information and liability conditions. Non-permanent removal – though to a certain extent optimal – creates liabilities that warrant careful risk management. Thus, seemingly cheap land-based technologies can become expensive. We discuss possibilities for integrating CDR in the EU policy architecture and define four tasks: managing the emission cap; R&D support; quality certification of removals; management of liabilities from non-permanent CDR. We propose three institutions for these tasks: a European Carbon Central Bank, a Carbon Removal Certification Authority and a Green Leap Innovation Authority.
650			_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aCARBONO _970314
650		4	_aPRECIOS _948092
650		4	_aCONSUMO _940658
650		4	_aPOLITICA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE _948056
650		4	_948072 _aPOLITICAS PUBLICAS
650		4	_944260 _aFINANCIACION
700	1		_971294 _aEdenhofer, Ottmar
773	0		_9171652 _oOP 207/2024/1 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 80, n. 1, March 2024, p. 70-110
942			_cART