000			01471nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c149351 _d149351
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20240509135838.0
007			ta
008			240509t2024 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
245		4	_aThe economics of the public option _bevidence from local pharmaceutical markets _c Juan Pablo Atal, José Ignacio Cuesta, Felipe González and Cristóbal Otero
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe study the effects of competition by state-owned firms, leveraging the decentralized entry of public pharmacies to local markets in Chile. Public pharmacies sell the same drugs at a third of private pharmacy prices, because of stronger upstream bargaining and market power in the private sector, but are of lower quality. Public pharmacies induced market segmentation and price increases in the private sector, which benefited the switchers to the public option but harmed the stayers. The countrywide entry of public pharmacies would reduce yearly consumer drug expenditure by 1.6 percent.
650		4	_943603 _aEMPRESAS PUBLICAS LOCALES
650		4	_944135 _aFARMACIAS
650		4	_947714 _aMEDICAMENTOS
650		4	_947725 _aMERCADO
650		4	_942967 _aECONOMIA DE LA SALUD
650		4	_92961 _aCHILE
700	1		_971701 _aAtal, Juan Pablo
773	0		_9171654 _oOP 234/2024/3 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _g v. 114, n. 3, Marcj 2024, p. 615-644
942			_cART