000			02039nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c149158 _d149158
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20240404110635.0
007			ta
008			240404t2024 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_aFontana, Stefania _971577
245		0	_aAnti-mafia policies and public goods in Italy _c Stefania Fontana & Giorgio d'Agostino
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper aims to evaluate the impact of a policy that targets criminal infiltration in local governments on the provision of local public goods in Italian municipalities. Building on the theoretical framework proposed by Dal Bò (American Political Science Review 100:41–53, 2006), we use a sufficient statistic approach to describe the dynamic behaviour of local public goods when stricter law enforcement weakens criminal pressure groups. Utilizing data on the local public finances of Italian municipalities spanning from 2004 to 2015, our findings reveal that, after the dismissal of infiltrated governments, the targeted municipalities devote a larger share of resources to public goods, with an estimated increase of approximately 3.9 percentage points. Notably, this effect seems to be driven by an increase in investment of approximately 3 percentage points. Overall, our results suggest that policies targeting the problem of criminal infiltration in local governments can improve socioeconomic conditions and the well-being of local communities, by increasing investments in economically and socially relevant public goods.
650		4	_941326 _aCORRUPCION
650		4	_950215 _aORGANIZACIONES DELICTIVAS
650		4	_aCONTROL _940745
650		4	_97293 _aADMINISTRACION LOCAL
650		4	_933417 _aBIENES PUBLICOS LOCALES
650		4	_aITALIA _947518
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700			_aD'Agostino, Giorgio _971578
773	0		_9171455 _oOP 1443/2024/198/3/4 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 198, n. 3-4, March 2023, p. 493-529
942			_cART