000			01796nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c149157 _d149157
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20240404105943.0
007			ta
008			240404t2024 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_aParker, Simon C. _922546
245		0	_aDemocracy, corruption, and endogenous entrepreneurship policy _c Simon C. Parker
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper endogenizes pro-entrepreneurship policies in a model where voters choose the strength of these policies and entrepreneurs generate social returns which benefit the median voter. In the model, incumbent firms who are harmed by the greater competition that this policy promotes can push back in two ways: via corruption and persuasion. Specifically, they can bribe elected politicians to break their campaign promises; and they can allocate some of their rents to corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives that also benefit voters. The model predicts that corruption which weakens pro-entrepreneurship policy can be completely neutralized by a forward-looking median voter—without removing the incentive among incumbent firms to bribe politicians. In this way, endogenizing entrepreneurship policy can destroy any relationship between corruption and entrepreneurship. Corporate social responsibility initiatives modify this prediction, which provides a novel rationale for CSR that appears to be new to the literature as well.
650		4	_941326 _aCORRUPCION
650		4	_941808 _aDEMOCRACIA
650		4	_954507 _aEMPRENDEDORES
650		4	_955164 _aVOTO
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
773	0		_9171455 _oOP 1443/2024/198/3/4 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 198, n. 3-4, March 2023, p. 361-376
942			_cART