000 02193nab a2200265 c 4500
999 _c149156
_d149156
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20240404105415.0
007 ta
008 240404t2024 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
100 _aBracco, Emanuele
_971574
245 0 _aManipulating municipal budgets
_bunveiling opportunistic behavior of Italian mayors
_c Emanuele Bracco, Marco Alberto De Benedetto & Maurizio Lisciandra
500 _aResumen.
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aWe examine the political budget cycle hypothesis using revenue data from Italian municipal administrations. By leveraging on the staggered schedule of local elections and employing a difference-in-differences strategy, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by mayors. In pre-election years, mayors reduce total accrued revenues from municipal solid waste fees and property taxes, which are the primary sources of revenue in municipal financial statements. Non-term-limited mayors who seek re-election engage in such opportunistic behavior, while those facing a binding term limit do not manipulate revenues for electoral purposes. Our findings remain robust across various specifications and controls. Heterogeneity analysis suggests that the observed results are primarily driven by smaller municipalities, as well as by those situated in the South of Italy that exhibit low levels of social capital. Mayors employing political budget cycles also strategically offset reductions in highly salient fees and taxes by raising less salient non-tax revenues. This study contributes to the understanding of political budget cycles in the context of Italian municipal administrations and has implications for the broader literature on electoral behavior and public finance.
650 4 _948115
_aPRESUPUESTOS LOCALES
650 4 _948620
_aTRIBUTOS LOCALES
650 4 _943408
_aELECCIONES
650 4 _941326
_aCORRUPCION
650 _aITALIA
_947518
700 _aDe Benedetto, Marco Alberto
_971575
700 _aLisciandra, Maurizio
_971576
773 0 _9171455
_oOP 1443/2024/198/3/4
_tPublic Choice
_w(IEF)124378
_x 0048-5829
_g v. 198, n. 3-4, March 2023, p. 317-343
942 _cART