000 01395nab a2200253 c 4500
999 _c148863
_d148863
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20240130104907.0
007 ta
008 240129t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
100 1 _966189
_aOhrn, Eric
245 0 _aCorporate tax breaks and executive compensation
_c by Eric Ohrn
500 _aResumen.
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aI analyze the effect of two corporate tax breaks, bonus depreciation and the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), on executive compensation in publicly traded US firms. I find both tax breaks significantly increase executive compensation. For every dollar a firm benefits from the tax breaks, compensation of the firm's top five highest-paid executives increases by $0.17 to $0.25. The tax breaks increase compensation primarily in firms with weaker governance structures, suggesting the compensation response is driven by executive rent extraction.
650 4 _945680
_aIMPUESTO DE SOCIEDADES
650 4 _944038
_aEXENCIONES TRIBUTARIAS
650 4 _948221
_aREDUCCIONES TRIBUTARIAS
650 4 _97000
_aADMINISTRADORES DE SOCIEDADES
650 4 _948349
_aSALARIOS
650 4 _942888
_aESTADOS UNIDOS
773 0 _9171095
_oOP 2135/2023/3
_tAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy
_w(IEF)134825
_x 1945-7731
_g v. 15, n. 3, August 2023, p. 215-255
942 _cART