000			01654nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c148705 _d148705
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20231220125618.0
007			ta
008			231220t2023 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_971296 _aDiller, Markus
245		4	_aThe impact of public income tax return disclosure on tax avoidance and tax evasion _binsights from an agent-based model _c Markus Diller, Johannes Lorenz, David Meier
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe investigate how public tax return disclosure affects heterogeneous taxpayers' tax avoidance and evasion decisions when they maximize the sum of private expected utility (in line with Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) and social utility (which rewards behavior conforming to social norms). Taxpayers are located on a small-world network and directly observe their neighbors' wealth. Depending on what tax information is disclosed (nothing; net income only; both gross and net income), they can infer their neighbors' behavior with varying precision. Using an agent-based simulation, we find that partial disclosure of tax return information can yield more tax revenue than full disclosure.
650		4	_aDECLARACIONES TRIBUTARIAS _941766
650			_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650			_aINFORMACION FISCAL _971299
650			_aELUSION FISCAL _943410
650		4	_aEVASION FISCAL _944029
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_971297 _aLorenz, Johannes
700	1		_971298 _aMeier, David
773	0		_9170850 _oOP 207/2023/3 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 79, n. 3, September 2023, p. 235-274
942			_cART