000 01600nab a2200277 c 4500
999 _c148703
_d148703
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20231220124507.0
007 ta
008 231220t2023 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
100 _965949
_aFranks, Max
245 0 _aOptimal wealth taxation when wealth is more than just capital
_c Max Franks, Ottmar Edenhofer
500 _aResumen.
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aWe analyze the welfare implications of taxes on wealth, distinguishing between capital and land.We develop an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents and calibrate it to OECD data. We find that land rent taxes induce portfolio effects. Savings are shifted away from fixed land towards reproducible capital, enhancing GDP and reducing wealth inequality. Assuming a low pure rate of time preference, this can also raise social welfare, except under very low inequality aversion. By contrast, capital should be taxed only if inequality aversion is very high. We vary inequality aversion by considering three normative views: the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, prioritarian welfare functions and Rawlsian welfare functions.
650 _aRIQUEZA
_944024
650 _aPATRIMONIO
_947975
650 _aIMPUESTOS
_947460
650 4 _942588
_aDESIGUALDAD
650 4 _aBIENESTAR SOCIAL
_933421
650 4 _97978
_aIMPOSICION OPTIMA
650 4 _947776
_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700 1 _971294
_aEdenhofer, Ottmar
773 0 _9170850
_oOP 207/2023/3
_tFinanzArchiv
_w(IEF)21244
_x 0015-2218
_g v. 79, n. 3, September 2023, p. 175-207
942 _cART