000 01455nab a2200253 c 4500
999 _c148392
_d148392
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20231030094656.0
007 ta
008 231030t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
100 1 _971106
_aAlbagli, Elias
245 0 _aImperfect financial markets and investment inefficiencies
_c Elias Albagli, Christian Hellwig and Aleh Tsyvinski
500 _aResumen.
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aWe analyze the consequences of noisy information aggregation for investment. Market imperfections create endogenous rents that cause overinvestment in upside risks and underinvestment in downside risks. In partial equilibrium, these inefficiencies are particularly severe if upside risks are coupled with easy scalability of investment. In general equilibrium, the shareholders' collective attempts to boost value of individual firms leads to a novel externality operating through price that amplifies investment distortions with downside risks but offsets distortions with upside risks.
650 4 _947736
_aMERCADOS FINANCIEROS
650 4 _947531
_aINVERSIONES
650 4 _952231
_aVOLATILIDAD FINANCIERA
650 4 _947776
_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700 1 _971107
_aHellwig, Christian
700 _93916
_aTsyvinski, Aleh
773 0 _9170508
_oOP 234/2023/9
_tThe American Economic Review
_w(IEF)103372
_x 0002-8282
_g v. 113, n. 9, September 2023, p. 2323-2354
942 _cART