000			01640nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c148217 _d148217
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230922123421.0
007			ta
008			230922t2023 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_97792 _aBuchholz, Wolfgang
245		0	_aImproving public good supply and income equality _bfacing a potential trade-off _c Wolfgang Buchholz and Dirk Rübbelke
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper explores for a standard public good economy how redistribution of income changes public good supply in a Lindahl equilibrium, which is a prototype of an efficient public good allocation. In particular, it is shown how under certain premises on preferences a less equal income distribution may lead to a higher public good supply in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than in a cooperative outcome as given by the Lindahl equilibrium. Then a trade-off between an increase of public good supply on the one hand and income equality on the other occurs. The degree of inequality that is needed for producing this result does not need to be too extreme but may be rather moderate, which is shown by an example with CES preferences.
650		4	_aBIENES PUBLICOS _933416
650		4	_aRENTA _950200
650		4	_aDISTRIBUCION _98496
650		4	_aIGUALDAD _945530
650		4	_aSALARIOS _948349
650		4	_aPOLITICA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE _948056
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_971011 _aRübbelke, Dick
773	0		_9170214 _oOP 207/2023/2 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 79, n. 2, June 2023, p. 146-163
942			_cART