000			01976nab a2200229 c 4500
999			_c148214 _d148214
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230922121712.0
007			ta
008			230922t2023 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_971008 _aBillon, Steve
245			_aTax competition and Leviathan with decentralized leadership _c Steve Billon
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThe traditional approach of public choice suggests that decentralization in the form of a fiercer competition may play an efficient constraint on the growth of self-interested governments. This paper analyzes the effect of decentralization on Leviathan state governments in the presence of intergovernmental grants provided by a federal layer. Under decentralized leadership, state governments strategically set their tax policy and wasteful consumption of public expenditures by anticipating the reaction of the federal government in terms of grants. The transfer scheme eliminates any incentive to engage in tax competition. However, it also creates an opportunity for state policy-makers to pass the financing of a part of their inefficient expenditures onto other members of the federation. In contrast to the conventional wisdom of public choice that focuses on simultaneous central and local decisions, increased competition in the decentralized leadership equilibrium might reduce citizens' welfare. Decentralization enhances the sharing of wasteful expenditures and the incentives to extract rents from tax revenues. The conditions under which more competition leads to higher wasteful expenditures and welfare worsening are derived.
650		4	_942579 _aDESCENTRALIZACION FISCAL
650		4	_940318 _aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA
650		4	_944156 _aFEDERALISMO FISCAL
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
773	0		_9170214 _oOP 207/2023/2 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 79, n. 2, June 2023, p. 93-110
942			_cART