000			01564nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c148208 _d148208
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230921131056.0
007			ta
008			230921t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_927311 _aMaggi, Giovanni
245		4	_aThe political economy of international regulatory cooperation _c by Giovanni Maggi and Ralph Ossa
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe examine international regulatory agreements that are negotiated under lobbying pressures from producer groups. The way in which lobbying influences the cooperative setting of regulatory policies, as well as the welfare impacts of international agreements, depend crucially on whether the interests of producers in different countries are aligned or in conflict. The former situation tends to occur for product standards, while the latter tends to occur for process standards. We find that, if producer lobbies are strong enough, agreements on product standards lead to excessive deregulation and decrease welfare, while agreements on process standards tighten regulations and enhance welfare.
650		4	_948051 _aPOLITICA COMERCIAL
650		4	_939231 _aCOMERCIO INTERNACIONAL
650		4	_947916 _aORGANIZACION MUNDIAL DEL COMERCIO
650		4	_913163 _aCOOPERACION INTERNACIONAL
650		4	_942531 _aDERECHO MERCANTIL
700	1		_971003 _aOssa, Ralph
773	0		_9170218 _oOP 234/2023/8 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _g v. 113, n. 8, August 2023, p. 2168-2200
942			_cART