000			01743nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c148205 _d148205
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230921120355.0
007			ta
008			230921t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_970997 _aGeruso, Michael
245		0	_aWhat difference does a health plan make? _bevidence from random plan assignment in Medicaid _c Michael Geruso, Timothy J. Layton and Jacob Wallace
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aExploiting the random assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care plans, we find substantial plan-specific spending effects despite plans having identical cost sharing. Enrollment in the lowest-spending plan reduces spending by at least 25 percent—primarily through quantity reductions—relative to enrollment in the highest-spending plan. Rather than reducing "wasteful" spending, lower-spending plans broadly reduce medical service provision—including the provision of low-cost, high-value care—and worsen beneficiary satisfaction and health. Consumer demand follows spending: a 10 percent increase in plan-specific spending is associated with a 40 percent increase in market share. These facts have implications for the government's contracting problem and program cost growth.
650		4	_931104 _aASISTENCIA SANITARIA
650		4	_948069 _aPOLITICA SANITARIA
650		4	_944933 _aGASTOS SANITARIOS
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_970128 _aLayton, Timothy J.
700	1		_970998 _aWallace, Jacob
773	0		_9170206 _oOP 2134/2023/3 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Applied Economics _w(IEF)82246 _x 1945-7782 _g v.15, n. 3, July 2023, p. 341-379
942			_cART