000			01642nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c148204 _d148204
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230921120723.0
007			ta
008			230921t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_970994 _aFischer, Torben
245		0	_aAdverse selection in low-income health insurance markets _bevidence from an RCT in Pakistan _c Torben Fischer, Markus Frölich and Andreas Landmann
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe present robust evidence on adverse selection in hospitalization insurance for low-income individuals that received first-time access to insurance. A large randomized control trial from Pakistan allows us to separate adverse selection from moral hazard, estimate how selection changes at different points of the demand curve, and test simple measures to limit adverse selection. The results reveal substantial selection in individual policies, leading to welfare losses and the threat of a market breakdown. Bundling insurance policies at the household level or higher almost eliminates adverse selection, thus mitigating its welfare consequences and facilitating sustainable insurance supply.
650		4	_948380 _aSEGUROS DE SALUD
650		4	_950224 _aDESARROLLO ECONOMICO
650		4	_947750 _aMIGRACIONES INTERIORES
650		4	_947942 _aPAKISTAN
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_970995 _aFröhlich, Markus
700	1		_970996 _aLandmann, Andreas
773	0		_9170206 _oOP 2134/2023/3 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Applied Economics _w(IEF)82246 _x 1945-7782 _g v.15, n. 3, July 2023, p. 313-340
942			_cART