000			01747nab a2200229 c 4500
999			_c147800 _d147800
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230630131448.0
007			ta
008			230630t2022 uk ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_970806 _aWoodhouse, Eleanor Florence
245		0	_aAccountability and corruption displacement _bevidence from Italy _c Eleanor Florence Woodhouse
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aOne of the reasons for which corruption is so difficult to eradicate is because the actors involved are skilled in adapting their behaviour to changing institutional landscapes. However, surprisingly little is known about how corruption displacement functions across multiple levels of government. Using novel multilevel data on a political scandal in Italy and a Difference-in-Differences estimation strategy, I provide within-country evidence that a sudden increase in accountability for national deputies can impact negatively upon the behaviour of local-level public officials and politicians. In treated districts, where there is an increase in the indictment rate of national deputies, local-level corruption increases significantly as compared to nontreated districts. My results show how, in contexts characterised by systemic corruption, changes intended to enhance accountability can trigger a series of mechanisms within the political machine that exploit different levels of government.
650		4	_941326 _aCORRUPCION
650		4	_aHACIENDA PUBLICA _950201
650		4	_940817 _aCONTABILIDAD PUBLICA
650		4	_aITALIA _947518
773	0		_9169738 _oOP 1793/2022/4 _tJournal of Public Policy _w(IEF)17584 _x 0143-814X _g v. 42, n. 4, December 2022, p. 730-754
942			_cART