000			01676nab a2200301 c 4500
999			_c147729 _d147729
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230615145249.0
007			ta
008			230615t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_970739 _aTorslov, Thomas
245		0	_aExternalities in international tax enforcement _btheory and evidence _c by Thomas Torslov, Ludvig Wier and Gabriel Zucman
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe show that the fiscal authorities of high-tax countries can lack the incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. Instead, they have incentives to focus their enforcement efforts on relocating profits booked by multinationals in other high-tax countries, crowding out the enforcement on transactions that shift profits to tax havens, and reducing the global tax payments of multinational companies. The predictions of our model are motivated and supported by the analysis of two new datasets: the universe of transfer price corrections conducted by the Danish tax authority, and new cross-country data on international tax enforcement.
650			_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067
650			_aEMPRESAS MULTINACIONALES _943600
650			_aFISCALIDAD INTERNACIONAL _944303
650			_aEVASION FISCAL _944029
650			_aELUSION FISCAL _943410
650			_aPREVENCIÓN _954712
650		4	_aEXTERNALIDADES _944179
650		4	_aESFUERZO FISCAL _943747
700	1		_970740 _aWier, Ludvig
700			_962209 _aZucman, Gabriel
773	0		_9169689 _oOP 2135/2023/2 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy _w(IEF)134825 _x 1945-7731 _g v. 51, n. 2, May 2023, p. 497-525
942			_cART