| 000 | 01576nab a2200253 c 4500 | ||
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| 999 |
_c147726 _d147726 |
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| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20230615141318.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 230615t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
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| 100 | 1 |
_968703 _aCraig, Ashley C. |
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| 245 | 0 |
_aOptimal income taxation with spillovers from employer learning _c Ashley C. Craig |
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| 500 | _aResumen. | ||
| 520 | _aI study optimal income taxation when human capital investment is imperfectly observable by employers. In the model, Bayesian inference about worker productivity compresses the wage distribution, lowering the private return to human capital investment. An externality arises: given the same information, employers are more optimistic about each individual if workers are generally more productive. The significance of this externality hinges on the accuracy of employers' beliefs and the responsiveness of human capital. For the United States, taking it into account lowers optimal marginal tax rates for most workers, reducing them by a maximum of 9–13 percentage points between $50,000 and $100,000. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_950199 _aIMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA DE LAS PERSONAS FISICAS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_948256 _aRENDIMIENTOS DE TRABAJO |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947884 _aTRABAJADORES |
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| 650 | 4 |
_927357 _aAPRENDIZAJE |
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| 650 | 4 |
_948148 _aPRODUCTIVIDAD |
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| 650 | 4 |
_97978 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS |
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| 773 | 0 |
_9169689 _oOP 2135/2023/2 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy _w(IEF)134825 _x 1945-7731 _g v. 51, n. 2, May 2023, p. 82-125 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||