000 | 01702nab a2200241 c 4500 | ||
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_c147634 _d147634 |
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003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
005 | 20230605183823.0 | ||
007 | ta | ||
008 | 230605t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
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245 | 0 |
_aTax Evasion, behavioral microsimulation models and flat-rate tax reforms _banalysis for Italy _c Andrea Albarea, Michele Bernasconi, Anna Marenzi, and Dino Rizzi |
|
500 | _aResumen. | ||
504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
520 | _aIt is sometimes argued that a flat-rate tax reform can reduce tax noncompliance. The argument is, however, inconsistent with the so-called Yitzhaki’s puzzle of the classical expected utility (EU) model. The latter predicts an increase, rather than a reduction, in tax evasion following a cut in the tax rates resulting from a flat-rate reform. We study the impact of a flat-rate tax in a microsimulation tax-benefit model of Italy, which allows us to analyze various hypotheses of tax evasion behavior. In addition to the EU model, we analyze expected utility with rank dependent probabilities (EURDP) and the model of reference dependent (RD) preference, the most favorable to overturn Yitzhaki’s puzzle. Our simulations show that a flat-rate tax would barely reduce overall evasion in Italy in all models considered. Redistributive effects are in all cases, large. | ||
650 | 4 |
_944029 _aEVASION FISCAL |
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650 | 4 |
_aSISTEMA FISCAL _948426 |
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650 | 4 |
_aREFORMA _910750 |
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650 | 4 |
_aITALIA _947518 |
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650 | 4 |
_947773 _aMODELOS DE SIMULACIÓN |
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700 | 1 |
_970690 _aAlbarea, Andrea |
|
773 | 0 |
_9169527 _oOP 581/2023/2 _tPublic Finance Review _w(IEF)21382 _x 0048-5853 _g v. 51, n. 2, March 2023, p. 262-310 |
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942 | _cART |