000 01464nab a2200253 c 4500
999 _c147544
_d147544
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20230524125019.0
007 ta
008 230524t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
100 1 _970634
_aGraves, Sebastian
245 4 _aThe state-dependent effectiveness of hiring subsidies
_c Sebastian Graves
500 _aResumen.
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aThe responsiveness of job creation to shocks is procyclical, while the responsiveness of job destruction is countercyclical. This new finding can be explained by a heterogeneous-firm model in which hiring costs lead to lumpy employment adjustment. The model predicts that policies that aim to stimulate employment by encouraging job creation, such as hiring subsidies, are significantly less effective in recessions: these are times when few firms are near their hiring thresholds and many firms are near their firing thresholds. Policies that target the job destruction margin, such as employment protection subsidies, are particularly effective at such times.
650 _aEMPLEO
_943494
650 _aDESEMPLEO
_942613
650 _aEMPRESAS
_943504
650 _aAYUDA ESTATAL
_932236
650 4 _955892
_aCREACIÓN DE EMPLEO
650 4 _934579
_aCICLOS ECONOMICOS
773 0 _9169407
_oOP 2137/2023/2
_tAmerican Economic Journal : Macroeconomics
_w(IEF)64915
_x 1945-7707
_g v. 15, n. 2, April 2023, p. 229-253
942 _cART