000			01687nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c147461 _d147461
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230516101252.0
007			ta
008			230516t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
245			_aPartisanship and fiscal policy in economic unions _bevidence from US states _c by Gerald Carlino, Thorsten Drautzburg, Robert Inman and Nicholas Zarra
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aPartisanship of state governors affects the efficacy of US federal fiscal policy. Using close election data, we find partisan differences in the marginal propensity to spend federal intergovernmental transfers: Republican governors spend less than Democratic governors. Correspondingly, Republican-led states have lower debt, (delayed) lower taxes, and initially lower economic activity. A New Keynesian model of partisan states in a monetary union implies sizable aggregate effects: The intergovernmental transfer impact multiplier rises by 0.58 if Republican governors spend like Democratic governors, but due to delayed tax cuts, the long-run multiplier is higher with more Republican governors, generating an intertemporal policy trade-off.
650			_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067
650		4	_947972 _aPARTIDOS POLITICOS
650		4	_aFEDERALISMO _944154
650		4	_932226 _aAUTONOMIA FINANCIERA
650		4	_948053 _aPOLITICA DE GASTO PUBLICO
650			_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
650			_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
700			_99050 _aCarlino, Gerald, A.
773	0		_9169252 _oOP 234/2023/3 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _g v. 113, n. 3, March 2023, p. 701-737
942			_cART