000			01817nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c147353 _d147353
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230426143822.0
007			ta
008			230425s2022 us |||||o|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _beng _cES-MaIEF
100			_950837 _aBundorf, M. Kate
245	1	4	_aThe responsiveness of medicaid spending to the federal subsidy _c M. Kate Bundorf and Daniel P. Kessler
520			_aAlthough economic theory suggests that the federal government can influence spending by states through subsidies to programs that states operate, no recent work has quantified the magnitude of this effect for Medicaid, the largest program of this type in the United States. We find that Medicaid spending per enrollee responds to the magnitude of the federal subsidy. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) and its subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court gave states the option to expand eligibility for their Medicaid programs in exchange for increases in the generosity of the federal subsidy for the population made eligible by the expansion. States that exercised this option increased Medicaid spending per enrollee on enrollees who were eligible even before the ACA by approximately 15 percent. Depending on the specification, this translates into an elasticity of Medicaid spending per enrollee with respect to the after-subsidy price of Medicaid to a state of −0.494 to −0.579.
650		4	_948380 _aSEGUROS DE SALUD
650		4	_931104 _aASISTENCIA SANITARIA
650		4	_948379 _aSEGURO DE DESEMPLEO
650		4	_944933 _aGASTOS SANITARIOS
650		4	_933483 _aCALCULO ECONOMICO
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
700			_923658 _aKessler, Daniel Philip
773	0		_9169162 _oOP 233/2022/4 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _g v. 75, n. 4, december 2022, p. 661-680
942			_cART