000			01473nab a2200229 c 4500
999			_c147344 _d147344
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230424181403.0
007			ta
008			230424t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
245			_aTax audits as scarecrows _bevidence from a large-scale field experiment _c by Marcelo Bergolo, Rodrigo Ceni Guillermo Cruces, Matias Giaccobasso and Ricardo Perez-Truglia
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThe canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with a tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than US$200 million in taxes per year. We find that providing information about audits significantly affected tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
650		4	_943601 _aEMPRESAS PEQUEÑAS Y MEDIANAS
650		4	_932216 _aAUDITORIA FISCAL
650		4	_944029 _aEVASION FISCAL
650		4	_943410 _aELUSION FISCAL
700	1		_966371 _aBérgolo, Marcelo
773	0		_9169169 _oOP 2135/2023/1 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy _w(IEF)134825 _x 1945-7731 _g v. 15, n. 1, February 2023, p. 110-153
942			_cART