000			01623nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c147220 _d147220
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230323142131.0
007			ta
008			230323t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_970435 _aSabet, Navid
245		0	_aTurning out for redistribution _bthe effect of voter turnout on top marginal tax rates _c Navid Sabet
500			_aResumen.
500			_aApéndice.
520			_aI investigate the impact of voter turnout on top marginal tax rates in OECD countries between 1974 and 2013. I find that higher turnout leads to higher taxes for top earners, a result broadly consistent with the median voter theorem. Using novel survey data, I confirm that individuals in all but the wealthiest income bracket prefer higher taxes on the rich more than they prefer greater government spending in the economy. In line with these preferences, I find that turnout has a significantly negative effect on top income shares but no effect on the size of government or on public welfare expenditure. An instrumental variables approach confirms my findings. Overall, the paper is the first of its kind to link turnout to measures of redistribution that affect top earners and to preferences for redistribution.
650		4	_aELECCIONES _943408
650		4	_aPARTICIPACION CIUDADANA _947966
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aTIPOS DE GRAVAMEN _948570
650		4	_aREDISTRIBUCION _948219
650		4	_aRENTA _950200
773	0		_9168991 _oOP 1443/2023/194/3/4 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 194, n. 3-4, March 2023, p. 347-367
942			_cART