000			01706nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c147219 _d147219
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230323121937.0
007			ta
008			230323t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_970433 _aLarraín, Guillermo
245		0	_aHow not to write a constitution _blessons from Chile _c Guillermo Larrain, Gabriel Negretto, Stefan Voigt
500			_aResumen.
500			_aApéndice.
520			_aOn September 4, 2022, Chilean voters massively turned down a constitutional proposal that responded to widely shared criticisms of the 1980 constitution and emerged from a consensual and participatory process. This result is paradoxical because ex ante, the odds seemed largely in favor of changing the status quo. We argue that three factors, which derived from the interaction between rules and political contingency, explain the outcome: a Convention under the control of party-less independents, the exceptional underrepresentation of the political right, and a highly decentralized and public writing process. We extract some lessons from the failed experience that can be useful for countries seeking to deepen democratization through constitutional change and for a future constitution-making process in Chile.
650			_aCONSTITUCIONES _940622
650			_aDEMOCRACIA _941808
650			_aVOTO _955164
650			_aPARTIDOS POLITICOS _947972
650			_aDERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL _941978
650			_aCHILE _92961
700	1		_970434 _aNegretto, Gabriel
700			_959610 _aVoigt, Stefan
773	0		_9168991 _oOP 1443/2023/194/3/4 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 194, n. 3-4, March 2023, p. 233-247
942			_cART