000			01797nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c147042 _d147042
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230207110333.0
007			ta
008			230203t2022 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_957279 _aAn, Zhiyong
245		0	_aSocial versus individual work preferences _bimplications for optimal income taxation _c Zhiyong An and David Coady
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThe benchmark optimal income taxation model of Mirrlees (1971) finds that the optimal marginal income tax rate (MIT) is always non-negative. This paper extends the benchmark model to allow for differences in social and individual work preferences while maintaining its assumption that individuals are rational. The theoretical and simulation analyses show that under this model, when the government places a higher social weight on work than individuals, the optimal MIT schedule is shifted downwards, introducing the possibility for optimal wage subsidies at the bottom of the income distribution. This implies lower revenues, demogrants and overall progressivity. The case for wage subsidies is reinforced when the government places a relatively higher weight on work for low earners. The model also allows for an analysis of the optimal income tax schedule when government places a social value on unpaid non-market work as argued by Atkinson (2009, 2015).
650		4	_aPRESTACIONES SOCIALES _948107
650		4	_aRENDIMIENTOS DE TRABAJO _948256
650			_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aIMPOSICION OPTIMA _97978
650		4	_aMODELOS DE SIMULACIÓN _947773
700	1		_970354 _aCoady, Coady
773	0		_9168722 _oOP 207/2022/4 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 78, n. 4, December 2022, p. 393-421
942			_cART