000			01796nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c147040 _d147040
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230207102900.0
007			ta
008			230203t2023 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_970352 _aKellner, Maximilian
245		0	_aStrategic effects of stock pollution _bthe positive theory of fiscal deficits revisited _c Maximilian Kellner
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis article introduces a dynamic political-economy model of public debt which integrates climate policy. Strategic incentives are shaped by both an emission interaction and a budget interaction if public good provision contributes to a stock of persistent pollution. In a bipartisan system, politicians, who disagree on the optimal internalization of pollution, compete for office. The central finding is that bequeathing a large stock of pollution to the future government is not optimal for any incumbent regardless of their environmental preferences. This leads to strategic emission abatement in the first period. Additionally, while the incumbent engages in strategic deficit spending when reelection is uncertain, this effect is no longer necessarily inefficient when accounting for stock pollution. Both effects may increase welfare as a direct result of reelection uncertainty.
650		4	_948066 _aPOLITICA ECONOMICA
650		4	_948062 _aPOLITICA MONETARIA
650		4	_941783 _aDEFICIT PUBLICO
650		4	_947378 _aINGRESOS FISCALES
650		4	_947462 _aINCENTIVOS FISCALES
650		4	_948056 _aPOLITICA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE
650		4	_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
773	0		_9168781 _oOP 1443/2023/194/1/2 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x0048-5829 _g v. 194, n. 1-2, January 2023, p. 157–179
942			_cART