000			01853nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c147039 _d147039
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230203125151.0
007			ta
008			230203t2022 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_94157 _aEconomides, George
245		0	_aUser prices and multiplicity in a simple general equilibrium model _c George Economides and Apostolis Philippopoulos
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe use a simple general equilibrium model with multiple equilibria in the form of a coordination failure in which the government has the option to finance the provision of a merit good by using user prices. Ourmain results, derived analytically, are as follows: First, the introduction of a price mechanism for the merit good forces agents to internalize the social cost of publicly provided goods and this allows for higher public expenditures other things equal. Second, if the economy happens to end up at a high-employment equilibrium, the introduction of user prices further improves private incentives and enhances aggregate efficiency, whereas it further deteriorates private incentives and hurts aggregate efficiency if the economy happens to end up at a low-employment equilibrium. Third, the mechanism of user prices breaks down as the publicly provided good becomes more and more public so that free-riding problems dominate, or when there is a threshold minimum level for this good that is sufficiently high as in the covid-19 pandemic.
650			_aPRECIOS _948092
650			_aINCENTIVOS FISCALES _947462
650			_aGASTO PUBLICO _944787
650			_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
700			_98393 _aPhilippopoulos, Apostolis
773	0		_9168722 _oOP 207/2022/4 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 78, n. 4, December 2022, p. 379-392
942			_cART