000			01789nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c146946 _d146946
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230116172615.0
007			ta
008			230116t2022 uk ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_970311 _aShepherd, Michael E.
245		4	_aThe politics of pain _bMedicaid expansion, the ACA and the opioid epidemic _c Michael E. Shepherd
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aFederalism allows state politicians opportunities to undermine or support for federal policies. As a result, voters often have varied impressions of the same federal programmes. To test how this dynamic affects voting behaviour, I gather data on the severity of the opioid epidemic from 2006–2016. I exploit discontinuities between states that expanded Medicaid and those that did not to gain causal leverage over whether expansion affected the severity of the epidemic and whether these policy effects affected policy feedback. I show that the decision to expand Medicaid reduced the severity of the opioid epidemic. I also show that expanding Medicaid and subsequent reductions in the severity of the opioid epidemic increased support for the Democratic Party. The results imply that the Republican Party performed better in places where voters did not have access to Medicaid expansion and where the epidemic worsened, demonstrating an unintended consequence of federalism on policy feedback.
650		4	_931104 _aASISTENCIA SANITARIA
650		4	_948069 _aPOLITICA SANITARIA
650		4	_942925 _aESTUPEFACIENTES
650		4	_955164 _aVOTO
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
773	0		_9168664 _oOP 1793/2022/3 _tJournal of Public Policy _w(IEF)17584 _x 0143-814X _g v. 42, issue 3, September 2022, p. 409-435
942			_cART