000			02073nab a2200229 c 4500
999			_c146909 _d146909
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230102130643.0
007			ta
008			221229t2022 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_970296 _aDenk, Peter
245		0	_aTax competition and the EU anti-money laundering regime _c Peter Denk
500			_aResumen
520			_aMember States engage in tax competition to expand their tax bases thereby risking a ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate tax revenues. The global minimum tax under Pillar Two is expected to contribute significantly to curbing this practice. Assuming that minimum taxation eliminates competition in statutory tax rates, tax competition is likely to continue. This is because countries then lower their effective tax rates by reducing tax enforcement. As audit strategies, unlike statutory tax rates, are not publicly observable, other countries cannot easily observe and can never verify them. However, countries reducing their tax enforcement adhere to a policy that implicitly encourages tax evasion. Hence, enforcement and observability problems can also be addressed indirectly by targeting their outcome – tax evasion. In most Member States, tax evasion is a predicate offence for money laundering that effectuates a very effective EU anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Its instruments cannot only serve as a tool to adequately address foreign tax evasion but also to reveal, monitor, and control, at least indirectly, other Member States’ efforts in the fight against tax evasion. AML legislation can therefore help to close a still unnoticed loophole in curbing tax competition that will not be addressed by introducing minimum taxation.
650		4	_944029 _aEVASION FISCAL
650		4	_aELUSION FISCAL _943410
650		4	_940318 _aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA
650		4	_933461 _aBLANQUEO DE CAPITALES
650		4	_948644 _aUNION EUROPEA
773	0		_9168618 _oOP 2141/2022/11 _tIntertax _w(IEF)55619 _x 0165-2826 _g v. 50, n. 11, November 2022, p. 803-812
942			_cART