000			01580nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c146891 _d146891
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221216115742.0
007			ta
008			221216t2022 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_965377 _aJessen, Robin
245		0	_aOptimal taxation when the tax burden matters _c Robin Jessen, Maria Metzing and Davud Rostam-Afschar
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aSurvey evidence shows that the magnitude of the tax liability plays a role in value judgements about which groups deserve tax breaks. We demonstrate that the German taxtransfer system conflicts with a welfarist inequality averse social planner. It is consistent with a planner who is averse to both inequality and high tax liabilities. The tax-transfer schedule reflects non-welfarist value judgements of citizens or non-welfarist aims of policy makers. We extend our analysis to several European countries and the USA to show that their redistributive systems can be rationalized with an inequality averse social planner for whom the tax burden matters.
650		4	_97978 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA
650		4	_948102 _aPRESION FISCAL
650		4	_aRENTA _950200
650		4	_aREDISTRIBUCION _948219
650		4	_aPOLITICA SOCIAL _948070
650		4	_aDESIGUALDAD _942588
650		4	_aDERECHO COMPARADO _941877
700	1		_970283 _aMetzing, Maria
700			_965378 _aRostam Afschar, Davud
773	0		_9168580 _oOP 207/2022/3 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 78, n. 3, September 2022, p. 312-341
942			_cART