000			01652nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c146866 _d146866
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221205130220.0
007			ta
008			221205t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_970264 _aKartal, Melis
245		0	_aFake news, voter overconfidence, and the quality of democratic choice _c by Melis Kartal and Jean-Robert Tyran
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common-interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We then analyze richer models that allow for partisanship, targeted misinformation intended to sway public opinion, and news signals correlated across voters (due to media ownership concentration or censorship). In our experiment, overconfidence severely undermines information aggregation, suggesting that the effect of overconfidence can be much more pronounced at the collective than at the individual level.
650		4	_941808 _aDEMOCRACIA
650		4	_947719 _aMEDIOS DE COMUNICACION SOCIAL
650		4	_946833 _aINFORMACION
650		4	_947876 _aOPINION PUBLICA
650		4	_970265 _aNOTICIAS FALSAS
650		4	_955164 _aVOTO
650			_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
700			_98348 _aTyran, Jean Robert
773	0		_9168553 _oOP 234/2022/10 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _gv. 112, n. 10, October 2022, p. 3367-3397
942			_cART