000 01676nab a2200277 c 4500
999 _c146865
_d146865
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20221205124349.0
007 ta
008 221205t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
100 1 _970262
_aBernhardt, Dan
245 0 _aDemagogues and the economic fragility of democracies
_c by Dan Bernhardt, Stefan Krasa and Mehdi Shadmehr
500 _aResumen.
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aWe investigate the susceptibility of democracies to demagogues, studying tensions between representatives who guard voters' long-run interests and demagogues who cater to voters' short-run desires. Parties propose consumption and investment. Voters base choices on current-period consumption and valence shocks. Younger/poorer economies and economically disadvantaged voters are attracted to the demagogue's disinvestment policies, forcing farsighted representatives to mimic them. This electoral competition can destroy democracy: if capital falls below a critical level, a death spiral ensues with capital stocks falling thereafter. We identify when economic development mitigates this risk and characterize how the death-spiral risk declines as capital grows large.
650 4 _941808
_aDEMOCRACIA
650 7 _967114
_aPOPULISMO
650 _aDESARROLLO ECONOMICO
_950224
650 _aDESIGUALDAD
_942588
650 _aPOBREZA
_948038
650 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
_947776
700 _924187
_aKrasa, Stefan
700 1 _970263
_aShadmehr, Mehdi
773 0 _9168553
_oOP 234/2022/10
_tThe American Economic Review
_w(IEF)103372
_x 0002-8282
_gv. 112, n. 10, October 2022, p. 3331-3366
942 _cART