| 000 | 01499nab a2200253 c 4500 | ||
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| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20221117192333.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 221117t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| ||eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
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| 100 | 1 |
_aHatchondo, Juan Carlos _970194 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aFiscal rules and the sovereign default premium _c by Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez and Francisco Roch |
| 500 | _aResumen | ||
| 504 | _aBibliografía | ||
| 520 | _ae study fiscal rules using a sovereign default model. A debt-brake (spread-brake) rule imposes a ceiling on the fiscal deficit when the sovereign debt (spread) is above a threshold. For our benchmark calibration, similar gains can be achieved with the optimal debt or spread brake. However, for a "Union" of heterogeneous economies, a common spread brake generates larger gains than a common debt brake. Furthermore, gains from abandoning a common debt brake may be significant for economies that are unnecessarily constrained by the rule. In contrast, abandoning a common spread brake would generate losses for any economy in the Union. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aDEUDA PUBLICA _942647 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aDEFICIT PUBLICO _941783 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888 |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aMartinez, Leonardo _970195 |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aRoch, Francisco _970196 |
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| 773 | 0 |
_9168431 _oOP 2137/2022/4 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Macroeconomics _w(IEF)64915 _x1945-7707 _g v. 14, n. 4, October 2022, p. 244-273 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||