000			01715nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c146765 _d146765
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221117192235.0
007			ta
008			221117t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| ||eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_aNakata, Taisuke _970192
245	1	0	_aExpectations-driven liquidity traps _bimplications for monetary and fiscal policy _c by Taisuke Nakata and Sebastian Schmidt
500			_aResumen
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aWe study optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents' confidence give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. Insights from widely studied fundamental-driven liquidity traps are not a useful guide for enhancing welfare in this model. Raising the inflation target, appointing an inflation-conservative central banker, or allowing for the use of government spending as an additional stabilization tool can exacerbate deflationary pressures and demand deficiencies during the liquidity trap episodes. However, appointing a policy-maker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society eliminates expectations-driven liquidity traps.
650		4	_aPOLITICA MONETARIA _948062
650		4	_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067
650		4	_aPENSAMIENTO ECONOMICO _947990
650		4	_aMICROECONOMIA _947747
650		4	_aLIQUIDEZ _953202
650		4	_aINFLACION _946815
650		4	_aGASTO PUBLICO _944787
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
700	1		_aSchmidt, Sebastian _970193
773	0		_9168431 _oOP 2137/2022/4 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Macroeconomics _w(IEF)64915 _x1945-7707 _g v. 14, n. 4, October 2022, p. 68-103
942			_cART